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“an isOlaTed Case”*: The slOvene CarinThians 
and The 1920 PlebisCiTe
absTraCT
The end of WWI saw the dissolution of the multiethnic Cen-
tral European Empires and the formation of new states based 
on Woodrow Wilson’s concept of national self-determination. 
This article underlines the limitations of Wilsonian national 
self-determination, focusing on the Slovene Carinthians and 
the pro-Austrian result of the 1920 plebiscite. The outcome 
of the plebiscite exemplifies that minorities are motivated 
by more than solely ethno-linguistic reasons when deciding 
what state to belong to. Even though other factors existed, 
the key motivations for Slovene Carinthians to remain with 
Austria were of economic and political nature. It will be con-
tended that the importance of the centuries long accultura-
tion of Slovene Carinthians to Austria brought them closer to 
Austria than to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
Additionally the phrasing of the plebiscite made Slovene Car-
inthians’ decision a question of state preference rather than 
ethno-linguistic identity. Moreover, the unpleasant occupation 
of parts of Carinthia by the troops of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes and the higher effectiveness of Austri-
an propaganda played a key role in the vote of many Slovene 
Carinthians. Lastly, the majority of Slovene Carinthians being 
farmers, reliant on Austrian trade opportunities, swayed them 
toward a pro-Austrian vote. Thus, the Carinthian plebiscite of 
1920 builds a strong case against the assumption that ethno-
linguistic ties alone should be the foundation for state forma-
tion arguing that other factors are equally or more important.
K e y  w o r d s: 1920 Carinthian Plebiscite; Slovenia; Austria; 
Wilsonian national self-determination
* Lord Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), English Foreign Secretary in Paris. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000)
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„OdOsObniOny PrzyPadek”: słOweńCy karynCCy i PlebisCyT 1920 rOku
S t r e s z c z e n i e 
Zakończenie I wojny światowej przyniosło rozpad wieloetnicznych imperiów w Europie Środkowej 
i powstanie nowych państw w oparciu o doktrynę samostanowienia sformułowaną przez Woodro-
wa Wilsona. Niniejszy artykuł uwypukla ograniczenia Wilsonowskiego samostanowienia, skupiając 
uwagę na przypadku Słoweńców karynckich i korzystnym dla Austrii rezultacie plebiscytu z 1920 
roku. Wyniki plebiscytu pokazują, że podejmując decyzję o swej przynależności państwowej, 
mniejszości kierują się  nie tylko względami etniczno-językowymi. Dla Słoweńców karynckich, któr-
zy zdecydowali się na pozostanie z Austrią, oprócz innych czynników kluczowe znaczenie miały 
motywy o charakterze ekonomicznym i politycznym. Autorka dowodzi, że wielowiekowa akultura-
cja Słoweńców karynckich w monarchii austro-węgierskiej spowodowała, iż bliższa była im Austria 
niż Królestwo Serbów, Chorwatów i Słoweńców. Taki wynik plebiscytu spowodowany był także 
sformułowaniem pytań: pytano o preferowaną państwowość, a nie o tożsamość etniczno-jezykową. 
Ponadto, kluczową rolę dla wyniku głosowania odegrał przykry przebieg okupacji części Karyn-
tii przez wojska Królestwa SHS oraz większa skuteczność propagandy austriackiej. Wreszcie, fakt, 
że większość Słoweńców karynckich stanowili rolnicy, którzy chcieli nadal korzystać z dawnych 
możliwości, jakie dla tego zawodu stwarzała Austria, wpłynał na to, że głosowali oni za pozostaniem 
w tym kraju. Plebiscyt karyncki 1920 roku stanowi zatem przekonywające świadectwo niecelności 
założenia, że same tylko więzi etniczno-językowe mogą stanowić fundament kształtowania państwa, 
a ponadto dowodzi, że równie ważną rolę odgrywają w tym także inne czynniki.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: plebiscyt 1920 roku w Karyntii; Słowenia; Austria; Wilsonowska zasada samo-
stanowienia
All translations from German to English are found in the Appendix. German and English place names have been 
used in the text but Slovene names have been attached in the Appendix since they are equally applicable.
inTrOduCTiOn
At the end of the Great War, United States President Woodrow Wilson effectuated the right of national self-determination for the ethnically diverse peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This notion of statehood and nationality allowed for the 
various peoples confined in the Habsburg vielvölkerstaat to create independent, demo-
cratic states or to confederate with ethno-linguistic kin-states. The effectiveness of na-
tional self-determination as a peacemaking and nation-building tool on dealing with the 
defeated Central Powers has been greatly contested. 
Following the Habsburg Empire’s dissolution, the Carinthian Plebiscite of 1920 not 
only put Wilson’s notion to the test, but also shows, in historic hindsight though, that 
this notion caused problems in the future. Contrary to what was expected, the Slovene 
Carinthians1 (SC) opted for staying part of Austria and recognizantly refused to join the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSCS)2, who insisted that Carinthian districts 
1 Carinthians held to be ethno-linguistically Slovene.
2 Created on December 1st 1918 by joining the Monarchy of Southern Slavs and the Kingdom of Serbia and 
Montenegro. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 49)
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inhabited by SC be joined together to the Southern Slavs’ territories instead of remaining 
part of the former ‘oppressor’ state, Austria. 
The historiographical debate amidst Austrian and Slovene historians questioning why 
SC voted in favor of Austria and not the KSCS accentuates flaws in Wilson’s notion con-
cerning influencing factors in decision making processes of minorities when exercising 
their right of national self-determination. In the case of the SC’ decision, these factors 
clearly reveal that they were not motivated by a desire to join a conceptually related eth-
no-linguistic kin-state. In fact, the contrary is true; a historical consensus agrees that most 
SC were not persuaded by ethno-linguistic ties in deciding their national fate.
The plebiscite of October 10th, 1920, resulted distinctly in favor of Austria. This out-
come has divided historians across the lines in assessing the key factors governing the 
Slovene Carinthian voters’ choice. While Slovene historians like Peter Vodopivec (1986) 
and Augustin Malle (2000) argue that SC formed a decision based on state preference 
and not identity, Austrian historians like Heinz Dieter Pohl (2002) suggest that the SC’ de-
eply set Austro-Hungarian acculturation prevented them from joining the KSCS. Hellwig 
Valentin (2009), Thomas Barker (1984), and Andreas Moritsch (1981), however, bring for-
ward pragmatic factors, maintaining that socio-economic benefits induced SC to opt for 
Austria. Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld emphasizes the international powers’ influence on the ple-
biscite toward a, for them more favorable, pro-Austrian result. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986) 
So far, historians have provided ample research on the factors influencing the SC’ cho-
ice, but they hardly discussed why the Carinthian vote runs counter to Wilson’s theory 
on ethno-linguistic factors serving as basic constituents of statehood. This paper will de-
monstrate that the Wilsonian notion’s geopolitical and geo-cultural blindness in favor of 
ethno-linguistic ties when applied to the defeated powers of WWI, illustrated in the case 
of Carinthia, failed to fully recognize the political and economic reality of the peoples con-
cerned.
Supporting this argument, four major factors impelling SC will be examined. Firstly, 
impacts of acculturation over six hundred years meant that SC were not single-mindedly 
motivated by linguistic ties. They shared land, religious customs and values, and historic 
traditions bonding them to the Empire and, consecutively, to Austria. Secondly, use of 
the ‘Miles Mission’s’3 findings in Carinthia will show that some Slovenes based their de-
cision on state preference, not ethno-linguistic links. They identified more advantages in 
joining the Austrian democratic republic than joining the military monarchy of the KSCS. 
Thirdly, SC participation in combating KSCS troops and the Austrian propaganda’s effec-
tiveness will show that, instead of welcoming the KSCS as ethno-linguistic kin, the SC 
perceived them as an enemy force. The SC’ reaction to KSCS occupation will underline 
that Wilson had not realized that a disruption of day-to-day life by foreign forces wou-
ld undermine the value of ethnic bonds. Fourthly, it will be argued that the economic 
benefits provided by the Austrian state, which would be lost upon separation, played a 
pivotal role in the voting decision of a predominantly agricultural Slovene population. Thus 
demonstrating, once more, that ethnic ties were overruled by other factors. This will be 
accomplished with the use of both primary and secondary sources. Most of the texts and 
sources will be in English and German; and Slovene sources have been incorporated, 
were translations were to be found.
3 Composed of two professors and two US army members, one Austrian, one Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes representative as part of the US mission to Negotiate Peace conducting research to define the 
Austro-Slovene border. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10)
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wilsOn’s naTiOnal selF-deTerMinaTiOn
“The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. it will raise hopes which can never be realized.”4 
The Allied Powers’ limited understanding of the multi-ethnic fabric of Austro-Hungarian 
society resulted in internal troubles for the newly created states, lasting partly to this day. 
This can largely be traced back to the limitations of Wilson’s notion of national self-deter-
mination in its application to reorganize the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire.
National self-determination embodied the essence of Wilson’s political thought mol-
ded by “a cluster of ideas embracing Christianity, self-government, democracy, nationali-
ty, and the organic state” (Lynch, 2002, p. 423). It provided a basis for “the freest oppor-
tunity to autonomous development”5 of nations that belonged to defeated empires. It is 
generally believed that, as Alfred Cobban has argued, national self-determination refers 
to, “the right of a nation to constitute an independent state and determine its own gover-
nment for itself”6. The confusion regarding the definition of national self-determination 
that still persists today, stems from the contrasting perception of its meaning at the time. 
While Wilson considered it to represent the right of “government with consent of the 
governed” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2002, p. 306), it was understood, in its application to Central 
Europe, as providing the basis for the creation of nation states built on ethnic ties. (Lynch, 
2002, p. 224) 
This paper will argue that Wilson greatly overestimated the sway of ethno-nationalism 
in relation to national self-determination. “[W]hat [did] ‘self-determination’ mean”, Fräss-
Ehrfeld asks, “when applied to a people who did not want to join the nation of their blood
-brothers, or else were absolutely indifferent to all national questions?” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 
1986, p. 8) In that case, ethnic and linguistic ties do not necessarily translate to national 
ones. (Pohl, 2002, p. 185) Hence, SC were compelled by other factors. 
The CarinThian PlebisCiTe
“The slovene who does not want to be a yugo-slav is a curiosity we should not have believed  
if we had not seen him, and in large numbers” 7
Wilson’s Fourteen-Points and his notion of national self-determination rearranged the bor-
ders and political fate of Europe. At St Germain, the Allies decided to re-establish the 
borders of the Central Powers by means of plebiscites. (Kapitan, 2006, p. 1) Generally, Al-
lied Powers saw plebiscites as the last resort to accomplish this. Yet Carinthia’s economy 
was highly dependent on the north of Austria, and had an important train transit route 
connecting northern and southern Europe. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 58) This prompted 
holding a plebiscite, despite the KSCS’ territorial claims founded on ethno-linguistic links. 
This plebiscite was to decide the national fate of the larger part of the klagenfurt Ba-
sin consisting of approximately 755 square miles with a population of 125,900 north of 
the karawanken Mountains. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 163) Also, the economically and 
4 Robert Lansing in Pomerance (1976, p. 10).
5 Point X Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, (1918) (‘President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (1918)’, n.d.)
6 Alfred Cobban in Ambrosius (2002, p. 125).
7 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
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administratively important cities such as völkermarkt, klagenfurt, bleiburg, Ferlach, and 
eisenkappel were located within the Basin, as were two vital bodies of water, the wö-
rthersee Lake and drau River, making it of key interest to both Austria and the KSCS. 
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 166) The Basin’s cities generally displayed a higher German spea-
king population while the countryside carried a predominantly Slovene population of 95 
percent or more. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 166) 
For the purpose of the plebiscite, an “ethnic line” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9; see map) 
divided the Basin into two zones. Zone A, the larger zone, was in the southern part of 
the Basin, covered 662 square miles and had 73,000 inhabitants, most being Slovene Ca-
rinthian. Zone B ranged over a territory of 133 square miles and had a population of 54,000, 
with a majority of German Carinthians8 (GC). (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9) To have a fair and 
democratic plebiscite, the Allies decided that, at first, the predominantly Slovene-speaking 
Zone A should vote, and should this bring a pro-KSCS majority, then the predominantly 
German-speaking Zone B should be allowed to vote. However, a vote in Zone B never oc-
curred because 59.04 percent of votes in Zone A went to remaining with Austria. (Fräss- 
-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 7) 
The plebiscite’s result contradicted many expectations, and especially those of the 
KSCS. The 1910 consensus had shown that in the area composing Zone A, 70 percent 
of the inhabitants considered the Slovene idiom to be their umgangssprache and thus it 
was assumed to also be a reliable determinant for nationality and national leaning. (Fräss-
Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 12) 
slOvene aCCulTuraTiOn TO ausTria: dOes language auTOMaTiCally 
equal naTiOnaliTy?
“if he feels himself a german, though it is not his mother tongue, is he to be counted as such?” 
(Barker, 1984, p. 86)
Historians, so far, have not placed enough emphasis on the circumstance of SC and GC 
having lived side by side for centuries, which effected the SC’ acculturation to the Habs-
burg Empire and, consequently, to Austria. Acculturation has been defined as “the dual 
process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact be-
tween two or more cultural groups and their individual members” (Berry, 2005, p. 698). 
This ongoing process generated, by degrees, basic communal relationships between 
Austrians and Slovenes. Sharing common customs and traditions, in part also common-
ly molded by Roman Catholicism’s prevalence, further reinforced these ties. Thus they 
“learn[ed] each other’s languages, shar[ed] each other’s food preferences, and adopt[ed] 
forms of dress and social interactions that are characteristic of each group” (Berry, 2005, 
p. 700). Martin Wutte in deutsch – windisch – slowenisch, (Klagenfurt, 1927) (Morrissey, 
2012, p. 33) introduced the contested idea of the windische9 as a group representing SC 
who unvaryingly preferred Austria to Slovenia or the KSCS. (Akturk, 2007, p. 28)
8 Carinthians held to be ethno-linguistically German.
9 Before the 19th century windische related to Slavs in general living amongst German speakers. It was 
used to differentiate Slovenes living in Carinthia and Styria from those living southward of the Karavank. 
With the rise of ethnic nationalism Austro-Germans started describing Slovenes who had assimilated to 
German culture and so spoke a Slovenian dialect blended slightly with German, as windische. This win-
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The acculturation of SC to Austria going back hundreds of years became more pro-
minent between the Austrian Revolution of 1848 and the beginning of the Great War. 
While the highly popular concept of ethnic nationalism swept across Europe only few 
SC pursued the idea of an independent Slovenia. Since German gradually became the 
Empire’s official language, fluency in German was essential to rise socially in rank and to 
attain higher positions in both the economic and political spheres. Additionally, economic 
success being related to collaborations with German speakers gave rise to successful 
SC considering themselves more Austrian than Slovene. Moreover, the lack of populari-
ty for the Slovene national movement in Carinthia shows that SC did not fully embrace, 
joining the pan-Slavist movement or radically national ideas. Nor did they, for the most 
part and also due to constraining geographic obstacles, associate themselves with the 
rest of the Southern-Slavs. Lastly, failure to establish Slovene as a language taught on 
par with German allowed a German-focused educational system to reduce the use of 
Slovene to a language mainly used at home. All these factors combined inhibited growth 
of strong solidary or pan-Slavist nationalist feelings, and induced SC in their decision fa-
voring Austria in the 1920 Plebiscite. These Slovenes, contrary to Wilson’s expectations, 
did not want to reunite with Southern Slavs, preferring the life they had created over 
centuries amidst GC.
This dates back to when the Habsburgs acquired Carinthia in the 14th century. Under 
the Habsburgs, German established itself more and more as the official and dominant 
language. (Hunter, 2000, p. 7) This resulted in GC occupying higher social positions when 
compared to those held by SC. Of course there were also some wealthier land-owning 
SC, yet, they were mainly in agriculture and associated with forestry and cattle breeding. 
(Moritsch, 1981, p. 223) These wealthier SC occupied more influential positions within 
villages like, doctors, and teachers, and thus forged stronger socio-economic bonds 
between GC and SC. Depending on GC in the cities for trade, SC gradually identified 
themselves as Austrian rather than as Slovene. (Barker, 1984, p. 75) Accordingly, most of 
them stated that they had stopped considering themselves in the censuses conducted by 
the authorities before WWI as ‘Slovene Thinking’. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 225)
Speaking German as an essential skill for SC was not only reflected in the economic 
sphere but also in the success of the 19th century German nationalist10 movement ver-
sus the faintness of the Slovene counterpart. After the 1848 Revolution and during the 
remainder of the century, both German and Slovene ideas of nationalism eventually grew 
stronger, prompting deputy Joseph Mayer to remark in 1863 that „Vor dem Jahre 1848, 
lebten die Deutschen und Slowenen in großer Harmonie, man wußte nichts von zwei 
Nationalitäten [...] das Jahr 1848 kam und mit dem Jahr 1848 die Slowenische Agitation” 
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, pp. 29–30). Slovene nationalists tried to promote the uniting of SC 
via organizations like the Tabor Movement, established 1868 in krain, which encouraged 
the idea of a united Slovenia. (Pleterski, 1981, p. 51) Yet they never received enough 
support, lacking a common bond amongst all Slovenes in Austria. (Novak, 1954, p. 10) 
At a meeting in Vienna on deciding upon the new structure of Austria after the revolu-
dischtheorie impeded Slovene nationalism from flourishing in Carinthia. Wutte, after the Plebiscite, defined 
the windische as those Slovenes who voted pro-Austrian. Later on, windische was used by Austrian 
nationalists as an insult and was used to create a divide amongst the Slovene Carinthians. (Hunter, 2000, 
pp. 51–64)
10 During the early 19th century, German nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire related to cultural and 
linguistic ties. In the later 19th century nationalism started tying in more closely with regional links. After 
the German Unification in 1871, the idea of a distinct ‘Austrian’ nationalism became stronger. (Vink, 2013, 
pp. 12–13)
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tion, for instance, it was suggested to separate Austria according to kreise determined 
on “a national basis” (Barker, 1984, p. 63). The attempt for division based on ethnic ties 
was strongly resisted by both GC and SC. Instead of separating into two different na-
tionalities, GC championed the idea of Slovene integration and assimilation to Austria. 
Hence, stronger German nationalism imminently heightened the pressure on Slovenes 
to assimilate. That GC filled greater positions of power meant they could easily thwart 
any attempt by Slovene nationalists in consolidating the Slovenian standing in Carinthia. 
(Barker, 1984, p. 74) The GC further isolated SC from the Slovene national movement by 
threatening them that any non-German speaking children would never attain prosperity 
and rank. (Barker, 1984, p. 74)
In the education system, particularly, the German nationalists successfully marginali-
zed Slovene Carinthian nationalists. Under the reign of Maria Theresia and Joseph II many 
reforms improving the school system and the situation of minorities had been initiated. 
(Hunter, 2000, p. 31) Following the liberal Märzverfassung of 1848, each minority had 
the right to be taught in their respective mother tongue. Yet in Carinthia this met prono-
unced opposition, since it was viewed as Slovene emancipation sneaking in through the 
backdoor. (Malle & Entner, 2003, p. 4) Nevertheless, “[s]eventy-three Slovene schools 
were established in southern Carinthia, as well as five utraquistic schools and nine purely 
German ones” (Hunter, 2000, p. 32). The reichsschulgesetz of 1869 also empowered 
regional diversification of what language schools should teach in. (Hunter, 2000, p. 33) 
Despite these advances, Slovene was only taught up to the second or third grade and 
then replaced with German. It seems Slovene school instruction was mainly used as a 
stepping-stone toward teaching German. (Hunter, 2000, p. 33) Even though in 1880 and 
1891 orders from Vienna were delegated to Carinthia to ensure that Slovene be taught 
in schools, provincial Carinthian authorities remained hesitant in giving Slovenes oppor-
tunities to learn their language in a formal school setting. (Hunter, 2000, p. 34) More pro-
gressive teachers also encouraged instruction solely in German, after 1869, since they 
believed it would benefit their students’ career prospects in the future more than Slovene 
ever could. (Hunter, 2000, p. 44) 
Hence, the prominence of German instruction in schools further reduced a stronger 
budding of Slovene nationalist feelings. Andrej Einspieler expressed the sentiment of 
most Slovene nationalists at the time saying; “if one takes a language from a people, 
one has cut off a pulsating vein, has pierced its heart” (Hunter, 2000, p. 68). The failure 
to establish Slovene as a language taught in schools was a great setback for the Slovene 
national cause. The prevalence of German in schools as well as its importance in most 
spheres of life, except for the home, resulted in Slovene culture gradually receding and 
assimilation pressure to Austria rising further. Indeed, people declaring themselves as 
Slovenians in Carinthia decreased from 30% in 1890 to 9% in 1951 (Although emigra-
tion, as well as Germanization during the Nazi occupation (Kirk, 1991, p. 651) needs to 
be accounted for, assimilation also played a vital role). (Hunter, 2000, p. 29) This coin-
cided with a decrease in those who considered themselves Slovene speakers. While 
in 1848 there were 114,000 declared Slovene speakers, in 1919 their number sank to 
66,436. (Valentin, 2009, p. 21) It is important to note that the numbers garnered from 
these surveys questioned what the person’s umgangssprache was not one’s mother 
tongue. German being used on a daily basis did not mean Slovenian was no longer spo-
ken; it was just the result of German hegemonizing political and economic spheres. 
(Pohl, 2002, p. 183)
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naTiOnal selF-deTerMinaTiOn: a quesTiOn OF sTaTe PreFerenCe?
“i should have given all of Carinthia to austria without further ado” (Martin, 1929, p. 23)
While some Slovenes in Carinthia voted for the Basin to remain part of Austria because 
they had acculturated to Austria and had not formed a strong Slovene national identity, 
a number of identity-confident SC based their vote on the question of state preference 
rather than ethnic ties.
Even though the goal at Saint Germain was to find a way to divide Carinthia based on 
ethnic bonds, the research, conducted to achieve clarity regarding new state boundaries, 
shed more light on SC’ preferences of state than on ethno-linguistic links. The ‘Miles Mis-
sion’ was sent to Carinthia in 1919 to gather objective data and construct a recommenda-
tion concerning the viability of the Basin’s separation. Slovene historians have argued11, 
that the ‘Miles Mission’s’ conclusions transformed the plebiscite into a question of state 
rather than ethnic preference. Thus, some Slovenes in Carinthia based their decision on 
the preference of living in the more progressive, democratic, Austrian Republic rather than 
the structurally rigid military monarchy of the KSCS. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 102)
Due to bloodshed caused by increasing tensions between the KSCS and Austrian tro-
ops in 1919, the ‘Miles Mission’ went to Carinthia to prevent further escalation of hostili-
ties. The Mission’s research tour of the country lasted from the 28th of January to the 6th 
of February. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 96) The Mission, as Sherman Miles12 wrote to Archi-
bald Coolidge13, was supposed to collect information on, “(1) a clear and unmistakable 
geographical line of demarcation, (2) national desires of the people, and (3) how [their] de-
cision would affect the chances of a peaceful administration of the country”14. To accom-
plish this, the Mission tried questioning people from the most diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds, “peasants on farms and along the roads, merchants in villages, priests in 
churches, teachers in schoolhouses, lawyers, officials of all sorts, about everything under 
the sun” (Martin, 1929, p. 16). They even examined cemeteries to see if tombstone na-
mes pointed more to the Slovene or German origins of the deceased. (Martin, 1929, p. 18)
Despite trying to find the core leanings of SC regarding their relation to Austria and 
the KSCS, the questions asked by the Mission did not discover nationalist ties but un-
covered politico-economic preferences. Lawrence Martin15, in the “Perfect Day of an 
Itinerant Peace Maker”, written in 1929, provided some of the questions asked in his 
recollections:
“Would you prefer to be ruled by Austria or by Yugoslavia?”
“Were your markets before the war northward toward Vienna, eastward toward Marburg, 
or southward toward Trieste across the rugged Karawanken?”
“Is the majority of people in this village Austrian or Slovene?” 
“Of course, we know that they are Carinthian; but where did your grandfathers come from? 
And what language did they speak?” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 16)  
11 Vodopivec, Pleterski, Moritsch.
12 Head of ‘Miles Mission’ and US army member. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10)
13 Head of the commission to observe the political situation in former Austria-Hungary. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, 
p. 9)
14 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
15 Major in the US army, specialist for the Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, professor 
of geography, and Mission Member. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10).
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Examining the wording of these questions, the slight impression arises that they 
are phrased suggestively in favor of Austria. Especially the second question displays a 
slant using suggestive imagery via the adjective ‘rugged’. The questions failed to obtain 
insights as to what ethnic group Slovenes felt closer to but gained insights of what 
state they preferred to be part of. Thus, the ‘Miles Mission’ changed their initial view 
of separating the Basin along an ethnic divide. (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 22) They saw that 
the “majority of Slovenes thought it wiser that they should continue to be subjects of 
Austria” (Martin, 1929, p. 23) and “from the point of view of national desires, [their] in-
vestigation convinced [them] that the majority of the people between the Drau and the 
Karawanken [...] preferred Austrian rule”16. This shows that in Carinthia national self-
determination related not to ethno-linguistic ties but to the dominance of economic and 
political preferences. 
Therefore, the KSCS regarded the ‘Miles Mission’s’ conclusion as biased and unfair. 
They considered the Mission to have had preconceived pro-Austrian views, and accu-
sed them of not properly researching less prominent parts of the Basin. (Barker, 1984, 
p. 105) In addition, the KSCS felt that the ‘Miles Mission’, consisting largely of foreig-
ners, would not induce Slovene inhabitants to express their true feelings, but would en-
tice them to answer questions in German due to the official character of the interviews. 
(Barker, 1984, p. 105) Recollections of the ‘Miles Mission’s’ work by Martin offer histo-
rical insight to the limitations of the Mission’s work. His essay was published long after 
the Mission left Carinthia. Therefore one must bear in mind the possible skews of me-
mory provoked by the passage of time. Although he presents the facts objectively and 
accurately, his pro-Austrian bias does shimmer through. One must consider that Martin, 
geographer that he was, might have recommended for the Basin not to be divided be-
cause he strongly appreciated a geographically organic unity. Also, Martin was limited in 
his research because he spoke no Slovene, thus he may not have been able to fathom 
completely the opinions expressed by Slovenes questioned. Particularly since Robert 
Kerner,17 proficient in Slovene, strongly recommended the division of the Basin. It is also 
important to point out that the KSCS troops’ aggressive conduct may have swayed Mar-
tin against the KSCS, and may therefore have influenced his recommendations opposing 
a separation.
Despite complaints of partisanship on the KSCS side, it is fair to say that the Mission’s 
conclusions reflected the sentiments of the majority of the Basin’s Slovenes. The new-
ly created, “decentralized parliamentary monarchy” (Dinko, 1940, p. 582) of the KSCS 
did not appeal to the Basin’s Slovenes. The KSCS, under Serbian stronghold, was foun-
ded on the “autocratic rule of the monarch, by frequent uprisings of a military charac-
ter, by wars and territorial expansion, and by chronic constitutional crisis” (Dinko, 1940, 
p. 584). Although a “parliamentary monarchy”, in reality the King had complete control 
of the government, and parliament only exercised a very limited influence. (Dinko, 1940, 
p. 586) In comparison, the First Austrian Republic offered more. The new republic’s mi-
litary being constricted by the Treaty of St Germain and, like the country itself, in poor 
economic repair meant that male citizens were not threatened by imminent conscription. 
(Wambaugh, 1993, p. 204) Additionally, even though in transition, after the monarchy’s 
demise, Austria still possessed a relatively stable government. It boasted a strong Social 
16 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p.135).
17 Member of ‘Miles Mission’ and professor of Slavic studies at University of Missouri. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, 
p. 10).
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Democratic party and a working parliamentary system in place. (Hanisch, 1994, p. 274) 
Janko Pleterski cogently observes that the social-democratically ruled republic drew in 
social-democratically inclined SC, thus prompting politically ideologically motivated loyal-
ty to select for aspects of state over aspects of ethno-linguistic coherence. He substan-
tiates this indicating that the number of pro-Austrian Slovene voters and Slovene social 
democrats compared with the parliamentary elections of June 19th 1921. This suggests 
that Slovene social democrats may have turned the plebiscite into an Austrian victory. 
(Moritsch, 1981, p. 227) 
Furthermore, the Slovenes voting for Austria consonant with their state preference 
did not necessarily consider themselves assimilated to Austria. For them, remaining with 
Austria did not render them any less Slovene. (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 23) A pro-Austrian 
propaganda poster reads, 
SLOVENES! LET US STAY IN CARINTHIA! YOU WILL SEE THAT WE SHALL OUTLIVE EVEN 
THE SLOVENES IN SLOVENIA! [...] WE SHALL SPEAK OUR DEAR MOTHER-TONGUE UN-
DER AUSTRIA IN AN UNDIVIDED CARITHNIA WE SLOVENES SHALL STAY (Vodopivec, 
1986, p. 23). 
It must be noted that many SC, like many other peoples in the Habsburg Empire, la-
cking a national identity may have transferred the loyalty they bestowed on the ruling 
Habsburg dynasty as source of authority and power onto that of the republican state. 
(Rathkolb, 2013) This Slovene population segment saw their autonomy or way of life not 
endangered in Austria, and for that reason alone did not want to become part of a dictato-
rial and military oriented KSCS. 
The ksCs OCCuPaTiOn: The eThniC brOTher, an invader raTher Than 
a liberaTOr?
“kärnten frei und ungeteilt”
The KSCS believed that the Austrians had been suppressing the Slovenes in Carinthia 
and brainwashed them into being pro-Austrian. They “[...] undoubtedly claim[ed] that the 
Austrian leanings of their brethren in Carinthia [were] due to [...] Germanization, and that 
in a few years under the rule of their own people the Carinthian Slovenes would become 
as loyal to their nationality, as the rest of their brethren”18. Therefore, the KSCS wanted 
every part of Carinthia, where Slovene inhabitants could be traced back 50 years, to be-
come part of their kingdom. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 151) For them, the ideal situation 
was to receive the whole of the Basin, including both major cities villach and klagenfurt. 
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9) 
SC did not agree with this plan; their committed participation in the abwehrkampf, un-
derlines the discontent of SC with the presence of, what they considered, enemy troops. 
SC living in Zone A during that time, experienced traumatic incidents inflicted by KSCS 
army and administration representatives, which dissuaded them from voting pro-KSCS. 
The effectiveness of pro-Austrian propaganda in promoting a unified Carinthia appea-
led much more to the SC population than KSCS’ propaganda that imposed their ‘ethnic 
brothers’ on them. Hence it seems that the KSCS, who according to Wilson’s concept 
18 Archibald Coolidge at American Commision to Negotiate the Peace of February 12, in Fräss-Ehrfeld (1986, 
pp. 9–10).
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would be more immediate to SC than Austria, was actually perceived more as an invader 
than a liberator.
The KSCS troops’ presence from the middle of December 1918 to June 1919 re-
sulted in effectively organized guerilla opposition from both GC and SC. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 
2000, p. 156) Although the Carinthian government called for all eligible men to join the 
fight against the occupier, the number of those actually conscripted was only 3 percent. 
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 120) This indicates that the Austrian military greatly relied on 
cooperation with civilian volunteer corps. That the better equipped and prepared KSCS 
army was driven out suggests that Carinthians as a whole did not want them on their 
lands.19 
This is exemplified by an incident during the occupation of the rosental Valley, located 
between villach and klagenfurt, during January 6th and 7th 1919.20 There, civilian GC and 
SC joined forces and managed, with only minor casualties, to expel the KSCS occupiers 
within 36 hours.21 The KSCS had already been in this area for two months, and technical-
ly could have won the support of the predominantly Slovene population. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 
2000, p. 106) Quite the opposite happened, fighting started in the town of arnoldstein, 
and several sources confirmed that a number of men from the pre-dominantly Slovene 
gail Valley were responsible for the attack.22 Miles states that “[…] the fight was started 
by Slovenes who were not from the Rosenthal but who fought to free the Rosenthal 
from Jugo-Slav occupation in order to clear their communication with their markets at 
Villach”23. This military commitment suggests that for SC, the KSCS’ troops constituted 
an aggressive enemy just as much as for the GC. The KSCS’ military presence threate-
ned the livelihood of SC and thus set them in opposition to their ethno-linguistic kin.
Adversity toward the KSCS is further supported by the reaction of Slovenes living 
in the separated areas outlined by the ‘ethnic’ demarcation line of June 1919. Whi-
le life in Zone B remained relatively unchanged with low military presence24, Zone A 
experienced the enforcement of drastic changes. The soldiers present created a ho-
stile atmosphere conducting house searches, enforcing internments, and imprisoning 
anyone who caused trouble or appeared pro-Austrian. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 172) As 
Miles reported the “Jugo-Slavs based their administration on military forces, but they 
also use[d] that force as a constant threat against the people” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, 
p. 136). This situation provoked not only discontent, it also fueled armed opposition 
against the KSCS, even amongst committed KSCS supporters like the Slovene clergy. 
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 172) 
In addition to military presence, the administration’s language and local signposts 
changed into Slovene. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) Slovene teachers were imported (Barker, 
1984, p. 147), and, in the 34 of the total of 51 municipalities in Zone A, KSCS mayors ar-
bitrarily replaced Austrian ones. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 171) Austrian aristocrats’ landed 
property was confiscated, and “German organizations and societies – economic, cultural, 
and social – were placed under army control and had to cease operations” (Barker, 1984, 
p. 147). Around 5,000 GC were driven from their homes, and those remaining suffered 
cruel discrimination. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) To counter-act these changes and to create 
19 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
20 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
21 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, pp. 135–136).
22 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, pp. 135–136)
23 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 137).
24 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
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the impression of improved conditions under the KSCS’ authority, food from the KSCS 
was sent to Zone A, and schools and roads were built. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) Neverthe-
less, as was seen by the result of the plebiscite the modifications made by the KSCS 
were not welcomed by the Slovenes but regarded more as a hostile takeover.   
The strong opposition of SC to the KSCS was further shaped by the effective use 
of propaganda by Austrians from summer 1919 to October 1920. (Valentin, 2009, p. 17) 
During this time, pro-Austrian propaganda surfaced everywhere. The Austrian propagan-
da system under the landesagiationsleitung disseminated propaganda to the separated 
Zone A through a vertrauensmann. (Barker, 1984, p. 148) He would smuggle propagandi-
stic flyers, stickers and posters into the occupied zone. (Barker, 1984, p. 148) 
Thus SC were constantly bombarded with the importance of Carinthia’s unity, and 
“kärnten frei und ungeteilt” became a key slogan of Austrian propaganda. Pro-Austrians 
argued for Carinthia’s unity referring to common customs, history, and age-long co-exi-
stence, but also underlining economic reasons. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 5) Slogans like, 
SEVERANCE FROM KLAGENFURT AND VILLACH MEANS OUR ECONOMIC DEATH. WE 
DO NOT WANT TO WITHER IN THIS FASHION. WE WANT TO LIVE AS FREE SLOVENE 
 CARINTHIANS IN A UNITED AND PEACEFUL CARINTHIA (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 24) 
resonated with many Slovene farmers. Printing posters in German, Slovene, and in lo-
cal dialects, the Austrian propaganda effectively captured the diversity of the Basin. Aus-
trian propaganda also exploited the SC’ fear of the KSCS’ militarism. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, 
p. 182) As can be seen in Posters 1 and 2 (See Appendix), Austrian propaganda success-
fully alienated Slovenes from the KSCS by highlighting the importance of the fruitful eco-
nomic and social opportunities present in Austria, in comparison to the lack of economic 
development and political stability in the KSCS. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 10)
KSCS propaganda, on the contrary, failed to recognize that not all Slovenes in Carinthia 
were alike. So it did not appeal to Slovenes acculturated to Austria or those yet undeci-
ded as what to vote in the plebiscite. (Valentin, 2009, p. 17) KSCS propaganda related 
only to Slovenes’ language and ethnic links to the KSCS. It instrumented slogans like 
„die zehn abstimmungsgebote für slowenen”, “4. ehre deine Muttersprache, auf daß 
du auf eigener scholle dein eigener herr werdest und nicht ein deutscher knecht” (Fräss
-Ehrfeld, 2000, p . 182 (See Appendix: Poster 3). The KSCS seriously believed that such 
slogans would convince the Slovene population to join them. In September 1920, Jovan 
Cviji stated in the KSCS’ nova europa; “The only thing that is sure is that the number 
of nationally conscious Slovenes has increased since our administration and troops have 
been in Zone A”25. In reality this was not the case; similarly to Wilson’s national self-
determination, KSCS propaganda focused too strongly on ethnic ties. It failed to appreci-
ate that many SC had a good life in Austria and were not waiting to be freed by strangers 
claiming to be their kin.
Thus, Slovene Carinthain reaction to the KSCS’ occupation shows that the Wilsonian 
notion did not adequately consider the effects of the division of a territory based on eth-
nic reasons, nor did it foresee that hostile disruption of daily life for those involved would 
engender opposition.
25 Jovan Cviji, nova europa, September 16, 1920, in Wambaugh (1993, p. 203).
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The slOvene FarMers: eCOnOMiC beneFiTs OuTweigh  
eThnO-linguisTiC Ties?
“wes brot ich esse, des lied ich singe” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 193)
A key aspect the Wilson’s national self-determination discounted was the importance of 
economic ties for people deciding what state they wanted to belong to. The ‘Miles Mis-
sion’ concluded that “from the point of view of economics, it is highly undesirable that 
the province of Carinthia be divided by a political frontier”26, and so no longer supported 
a division based on language. 
A reason leading to the Mission’s conclusion lay in the predominantly agricultural stru-
cture of Carinthia. Although it had some industry, it lagged far behind the rest of Austria. 
(Barker, 1984, p. 23) According to data collected in 1910, a significant number of Slove-
nes, 70.6%, were employed in the agricultural sector. (Malle, 2000, p. 175) While a num-
ber of Slovene peasants were subsistence farmers, a significant number sold their goods 
in larger cities. The largest, market-oriented Slovene agricultural properties were located 
north of the drau between klagenfurt and the town of griffen. Cattle and agricultural pro-
ducts cultivated there were mainly sold to markets in klagenfurt and völkermarkt. (Mo-
ritsch, 1981, p. 222)
KSCS administration falsely believed to be able to break this bond with Austria during 
the 12-month separation. Slovene farmers, having greatly relied on trading with the ma-
jor cities in Carinthia, now had to accommodate the division of the Basin, meaning they 
had to take “a long journey over the Loibl pass or [pay] a costly railroad fare through the 
Rosenbach tunnel” (Wambaugh, 1993, pp. 203–204) to KSCS territory, instead of having 
direct access to their usual trading places. Therefore, the division of Carinthia prevented 
farmers from selling their goods in Austria and forced them to compete with low prices 
offered by Croat and Serb farmers in the KSCS. This caused a stark decrease in income 
for Slovene farmers. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 18) The return to normalcy after the removal of the 
demarcation line proved to farmers how much easier life in Austria was. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 
2000, p. 193) They could now access all their usual markets, in addition to receiving more 
attractive Austrian food prices, which were higher due to the general shortages expe-
rienced in Austria at the time. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 230) Moritsch points out that since 
60 percent of votes were pro-Austrian, and most of the Slovene population consisted of 
farmers they leveraged a pro-Austrian outcome of the plebiscite. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 228) 
This is further supported by the fact that the communities closest to klagenfurt voted pro-
Austria. In the predominantly Slovene municipalities of Tainach and grafenstein, close to 
klagenfurt, the votes resulted in 85.9 and 88.1 percent pro-Austrian votes respectively. 
(Moritsch, 1981, p. 228) These results were even higher than the 83.4 percent achieved 
in the predominantly pro-Austrian municipality of völkermarkt. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 228) 
The argument gains momentum because urban votes mainly went to the KSCS. For 
city dwellers, it provided greater benefits. More food at lower prices was available, and 
more job as well as entrepreneurial opportunities were on offer. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 230) 
Yet, urbanites making up only a minority of the Slovene population, meant most of their 
votes going to the KSCS were insignificant to determining the result of the plebiscite.That 
Slovene farmers voted out of economic self-interest contradicted what Wilson and the 
‘Miles Mission’ expected before going to Carinthia. The Allies failed to acknowledge that 
26 ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).
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the Karawank Mountains, separating Carinthia from Slovenia, had created closer trade 
relations between Slovenes and Austrians. Before the Empire’s dissolution, there were 
“no barriers to trade and human movement” (Kladivo, Ptacek, Roubinek, & Ziener, 2012, 
p. 49) between the predominantly Austrian and Slovene populated parts of Carinthia. The 
two had “merge[d] economically, with capital, product, and labor flowing” (Kladivo et al., 
2012, p. 49). The line’s implementation severely disrupted vital relations forged in centu-
ries and they could not be dissolved based solely on ethno-linguistic similarities.
However popular it is for historians to stress economic factors concerning the Slove-
nes’ decision-making process is, it may be conceived of as biased in historical hindsight. 
Politico-economic circumstances in, both, Austria and the KSCS after WWI were highly 
instable and volatile. Back then no one anticipated which state would really enable a 
better life. Nevertheless, the importance of Austrian economic benefits were outlined 
by National Councilor Florian Gröger27 at the time when he explained that „ich glaube 
schon, daß es weniger die nationalen als die rein wirtschaftlichen gründe sind, weil die 
leute wissen, daß sie nicht leben können, wenn sie an Jugoslawien fallen”28.
COnClusiOn
Wilson’s Fourteen-Points and his concept of national self-determination based on ethno-
linguistic ties were the main criteria according to which the former empires were re-de-
fined and new states created in 1919. The impact this theory had on Europe can still 
be seen today. Wilson’s limited appreciation of Central European geography and of the 
former empires’ construct, as well as the victors’ unequal treatment of the defeated 
powers as prohibiting Austria to join Germany, caused far-reaching difficulties.
Even Hitler instrumented national self-determination based on ethno-linguistic links to 
justify the conquest of lebensraum to safeguard the “purity of the Aryan race.” This re-
sulted in the discrimination, persecution and expulsion of many Austrian Slovenes after 
the anschluss to National-Socialist Germany in 1938. Still today a minority of politically 
rightwing Carinthians consider Slovenes as foreign elements.
Therefore, the case of Carinthia provides an example of how Wilson’s idealistic con-
cept for people of similar ethnicity to confederate did not integrate the reality of political 
and economic contexts enough. As has been argued, Wilson had disregarded that living 
alongside for centuries resulted in the reciprocal acculturation of peoples forming the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Carinthia, a large number of SC had acculturated to Austria 
and so felt no affiliation to the KSCS. Furthermore, even though Wilson wanted peoples 
to join with their ethnic kin, the phrasing of research and questionnaires placed greater 
emphasis on issues of preferred statehood rather than on national identity. In Carinthia 
this is exemplified through the results of the fieldwork conducted by the ‘Miles Mission’. 
In addition, the creation of a demarcation line based on ethnic ties often resulted in un-
wanted significant disruptions of life. As was seen in Carinthia, the KSCS troops and the 
changes they implemented were perceived as an imposition. This is supported by the 
active role SC played in the abwehrkampf. Rejection of the KSCS is further corroborated 
27 Journalist and politician of the Social Democrat Party, later governor of Carinthia. (‘Florian Gröger’, 1990)
28 National Councilor, Florian Gröger in the minutes regarding the Plebiscite in Juli 28th 1920 in Hörzer (2008, 
p. 18).
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by the success Austrian propaganda achieved compared to KSCS propaganda’s failure. 
This focused too much on ethnic coherence, ignored the importance of the economic and 
cultural unity of the Basin and failed to embrace the diversity of Carinthia. Moreover, the 
Allied Powers did not recognize the importance of economic relations sustaining whole 
regions when carving up empires. As was seen, Carinthian farmers greatly relied on trade 
with Austria and a disruption of this endangered their livelihood. 
While political and economic factors were of grave importance in determining SC’ de-
cision, it would be worthy to examine other areas such as religion, for example. SC being 
predominantly Roman Catholic could relate more to Roman Catholic Austria than, the re-
ligiously diverse (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim) KSCS. Furthermore, greater insight 
to what determined SC’ decision could be given, in this essay, if access to interviews, 
and a greater range of primary documents, including Slovene and Serbo-Croatian sources 
would have been available.
Lastly, while this essay portrayed one case in which Wilson’s theory did not apply, it is 
important for historians to further examine the topic. To this day, the disputed implemen-
tation of national self-determination following the dissolving of the Central Powers’ multi- 
-ethnic empires generates continued conflicts. Therefore it is important to shed greater 
light on the topic in order to better understand what factors determine peoples’ conside-
rations for the basis of the creation of states.
aPPendix
Translations
Place names in english and slovene in order of appearance in text
• königreich der serben, kroaten und slovenen: Kingdom of the Slovenes Serbs, Croats, and Slo-
venes Kraljevsto Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (SHS), Yugoslavia
• kärnten: Carinthia, Koroški
• karawanken: Karavanks, Karavanke
• völkermarkt: Velikovec
• klagenfurt:  Celovec
• bleiburg: Pliberk
• Ferlach: Borovlje
• eisenkappel: Železna Kapla
• wörthersee: Lake Wörth, Vrbsko jezero
• Drau: Drava
• krain: Kranjska, present day Slovenia 
• villach: Beljak
• rosental: Rosenthal, Rožu
• griffen: Grebinj
• loibl: Ljubelj
• rosenbach: Podrožca
• Tainach: Tinje
• grafenstein: Grabštanj
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Translations in order of appearance in text:
(All tranlations rendered by the author)
  1) vielvölkerstaat: Multi-ethnic Empire
  2) umgangssprache: Day-to-day Language
  3) deutsch-windisch-slowenisch:German-Windic-Slovene
  4) windische: Windic
  5) “vor dem Jahre 1848, lebten die deutschen und slowenen in großer harmonie, man wußte 
nichts von zwei nationalitäten...das Jahr 1848 kam und mit dem Jahr 1848 die slowenische agi-
tation”: Before the year 1848, Germans and Slovenes lived in harmony, and no one conceived of 
two nationalities [...] the year 1848 arrived and with it did the Slovene agitation.
  6) kreise: Political Districts
  7) Märzverfassung: March constitution
  8) reichsschulgesetz: Imperial School Law
  9) abwehrkampf: ‘the self-defense struggle’
10) “die zehn abstimmungsgebote für slowenen”, “4. ehre deine Muttersprache, auf daß du auf 
eigener scholle dein eigener herr werdest und nicht ein deutscher knecht”: The ten Voting 
Commanments for Slovenes. 4. Honor your mother tongue so that you may be master of your 
own land and not a German serf. 
11) “kärnten frei und ungeteilt”: Carinthia free and undivided
12) landesagiationsleitung: Provincial Propaganda Directory
13) vertrauensmann: Secret Austrian supporter
14) “wes brot ich esse, des lied ich singe”: “Whose bread I eat, whose tune I play”
15) “ich glaube schon, daß es weniger die nationalen als die rein wirtschaftlichen gründe sind, weil 
die leute wissen, daß sie nicht leben können, wenn sie an Jugoslawien fallen”: I do believe that 
nationalist causes played less of a factor than the purely economic ones, since I know people 
will not be able to make a living once they belong to the KSCS. 
Maps:
Paris, 4th June 1919 Map
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 147)
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 Pro-Austrian Propaganda Posters: 
Poster 1
“What we reap in Carinthia we want to sow! We will remain loyal to Carinthia”
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 179
Poster 2
“The SHS-State does not have any labor welfare!”
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 177)
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Pro-KSCS Propaganda Poster:
Poster 3
(Hörzer, 2008, p. 20, translated from German by author)
  1. Believe in our victory!
  2. You shouldn’t mock Yugoslavia, it liberated you!
  3. Put all your work energy into the plebiscite!
  4. Honor your mother tongue that you will be your own master on your own ground rather than a 
German vassal.
  5. Do not kill yourself and your offspring by voting for the Germans!
  6. You shall not be unchaste with the Austrian strumpet!
  7. Do not let your Slovene-Carinthian land be stolen!
  8. Do not concern yourself with the untruthful promises and empty threats of the Germans!
  9. Do not covet Klagenfurt, because it will come to us on its own!
10. Do not covet German wealth, for there is none!
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